How North Korea Cashes Out Stolen Cryptocurrency to Fiat

How North Korea Cashes Out Stolen Cryptocurrency to Fiat
Selene Marwood / Nov, 19 2025 / Cryptocurrency

Crypto Laundering Success Calculator

Understanding North Korea's Laundering Process

North Korea uses a four-step cash-out system to convert stolen cryptocurrency into spendable fiat. This calculator shows how different factors affect the success rate and value of the conversion based on real-world data from the article.

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Based on the data provided in the article, the success rate of North Korea's laundering operations has increased significantly since 2022.

Stolen Value: $
Converted to Fiat: $
Success Rate: $%
Potential Value Lost: $

Key Findings from the Article

  • • North Korea has stolen over $3 billion in crypto since 2017, converting $2.1 billion to fiat
  • • In the Bybit hack, 87% of stolen Ethereum was converted to Bitcoin within 72 hours
  • • North Korea uses 400-500 small daily transactions to avoid detection
  • • Success rate in converting crypto to fiat within 90 days jumped from 65% to 92%

How North Korea Cashes Out Stolen Cryptocurrency to Fiat

North Korea doesn’t need to rob banks. It hacks crypto exchanges instead. And it’s getting better at it every year.

In February 2025, hackers linked to the North Korean regime stole $1.5 billion from Bybit - the largest single cryptocurrency heist in history. The money didn’t vanish. It didn’t disappear into the blockchain. It turned into cash. Real, spendable, untraceable cash. And that’s the real problem.

This isn’t a one-off. Since 2017, North Korean state-backed hackers have stolen over $3 billion in crypto. They’ve turned $2.1 billion of it into fiat currency. That money buys missiles, submarines, and nuclear warheads. It funds a regime under some of the strictest sanctions in the world. And they’re doing it by turning crypto’s biggest strengths - speed, anonymity, and global access - into weapons against global finance.

The Four-Step Cash-Out Machine

North Korea doesn’t just withdraw stolen crypto to a bank. That’s too easy. Too traceable. Instead, they run a four-stage laundering operation that looks like a well-oiled military campaign.

Stage 1: The Heist - Most attacks start with phishing, fake software updates, or compromised developer accounts. In the 2023 Atomic Wallet hack, hackers slipped malware into a popular wallet app. Once installed, it stole private keys from 4,100 users. No brute force. No cracking. Just social engineering. It’s cheaper, faster, and harder to stop.

Stage 2: Cross-Chain Chaos - Right after the theft, the stolen assets get moved across multiple blockchains. Ethereum? Done. Now it’s on Binance Smart Chain. Then Solana. Then Avalanche. Each transfer adds layers of confusion. Between 2021 and 2025, North Korean-linked groups moved over $1.2 billion through cross-chain bridges like Ren Bridge and Avalanche Bridge. These bridges let users swap assets between networks - but they’re poorly regulated. That’s the loophole.

Stage 3: The Bitcoin Pivot - Over 80% of stolen crypto ends up as Bitcoin. Why? Because Bitcoin is the most liquid, the most accepted, and the hardest to trace at scale. Once assets are converted to BTC, they’re easier to move through over-the-counter (OTC) desks and crypto ATMs without triggering alerts. In the Bybit hack, 87% of the stolen Ethereum was turned into Bitcoin within 72 hours. Speed matters. The faster they convert, the less time analysts have to freeze accounts.

Stage 4: The Fiat Flip - This is where it gets real. Bitcoin doesn’t pay for missiles. Dollars do. So the final step is converting Bitcoin into cash. And for that, North Korea relies on a handful of weak spots in the global financial system.

Cambodia: The Cash-Out Capital

If you want to turn crypto into cash without questions, go to Cambodia.

Since 2021, the U.S. Treasury has identified Cambodia’s Huione Group as the primary laundering hub for North Korean crypto. Huione operates under the guise of a legitimate financial services company. But its subsidiaries - Huione Guarantee and Huione Crypto - are fronts. They issue non-freezable stablecoins that look like real money but can’t be blocked by sanctions. These stablecoins are then traded for cash in Sihanoukville, where North Korea runs at least 14 crypto cafes.

These cafes don’t need IDs. They don’t ask questions. They take Bitcoin, give you cash. One cafe processes up to $2 million a month. And they’re not alone. Macau’s casinos accept crypto deposits with only 5% KYC checks - compared to 95% in regulated markets. That’s a 19x difference. North Korea exploits that gap.

Digital Bitcoin whales swimming through glowing cross-chain bridges in a sky filled with floating blockchain realms.

The Human Network: IT Workers as Money Mules

North Korea doesn’t just rely on tech. It relies on people.

Thousands of North Korean IT workers are stationed in China, Russia, and Southeast Asia. They don’t work as hackers. They work as software engineers, customer support reps, and blockchain developers - at real companies. They use fake Vietnamese, Indian, or U.S. identities. Their job? Build backdoors.

According to CSIS, 27 cases in 2024 showed North Korean employees at Chinese exchanges setting up direct wallet-to-bank transfers with only 12-hour notice before funds left the system. Standard fraud detection takes 72 hours. That’s a 48-hour window to move millions before anyone notices.

Some work as freelancers. They sign up for crypto payment gigs on platforms like Upwork or Fiverr. They complete fake projects. Then they cash out the crypto through local exchanges with no ID checks. They’re not stealing - they’re being paid. And the money? It flows back to Pyongyang.

Why Tornado Cash Died - And What Replaced It

Five years ago, North Korea used Tornado Cash to mix stolen crypto. It was the go-to tool. Until the U.S. sanctioned it in August 2022. The tool froze. The funds were blocked. And North Korea had to adapt.

They didn’t build a better mixer. They built a faster system.

Now, they use what experts call “flood the zone.” Instead of one big messy transaction, they run 400-500 small, high-frequency transfers every day. Each one is under $10,000 - the reporting threshold in most countries. No single transaction looks suspicious. But together, they move hundreds of millions.

They’ve also shifted to decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols. By swapping stolen ETH for USDC on Uniswap, then moving it to a regional exchange that doesn’t ask for ID, they turn crypto into cash without ever touching a centralized exchange. It’s not perfect. But it’s working.

An elderly woman stacking cash beside a stablecoin USB drive, while a mechanical fox watches silently from outside.

The Crackdown - And Why It’s Not Enough

The world knows what’s happening. The U.S., EU, and UN have slapped sanctions on dozens of wallets, exchanges, and individuals linked to North Korea. The Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework now forces exchanges in over 100 countries to share customer data. In Q1 2025, North Korea’s cash-out success rate dropped 22% compared to the last quarter of 2024.

But here’s the catch: their speed has increased by 65% since 2022. Their success rate in converting crypto to fiat within 90 days jumped from 65% to 92%. They’re adapting faster than regulators can react.

Chainalysis CEO Michael Gronager told Congress in April 2025: “We’re tracking more activity than ever - but we’re catching less.”

Why? Because the tools they’re using now - cross-chain bridges, DeFi protocols, fake IT workers - aren’t controlled by any single government. They’re global. Decentralized. And legal in many places.

The Future: Stablecoin Arbitrage and Custom Protocols

North Korea isn’t slowing down. It’s upgrading.

According to a March 2025 CSIS report, the regime is testing “stablecoin arbitrage laundering.” Here’s how it works: steal ETH → convert to USDC on a decentralized exchange → send it to a low-regulation exchange in Southeast Asia → sell USDC for local currency at a premium → profit. The price difference between markets is small, but when you’re moving $50 million, it adds up.

They’ve also recruited 37 blockchain developers from failed crypto startups to build custom cross-chain protocols. These aren’t public tools. They’re private, encrypted, and designed to hide transaction trails. One prototype could process $500 million without leaving a trace.

But the clock is ticking. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said in May 2025 that North Korea’s cash-out success rate could drop to 40% by 2027 - if global cooperation holds.

That’s a big “if.”

What’s Next?

North Korea’s crypto cash-out system is a perfect storm of tech, geography, and human deception. It’s not going away. It’s evolving.

Right now, the best defense is speed, coordination, and closing the weakest links: unregulated exchanges, fake identities, and cash-heavy crypto cafes. But as long as there’s a country that doesn’t ask for ID, or a developer willing to lie about where they’re from, North Korea will keep turning stolen crypto into weapons.

The question isn’t whether they can do it. They already are.

The question is: how long will the world let them?

How does North Korea turn stolen crypto into cash?

North Korea uses a four-step process: first, they steal crypto through phishing or supply chain attacks. Then, they move it across multiple blockchains to hide its origin. Next, they convert it to Bitcoin for better liquidity. Finally, they cash out through unregulated crypto cafes in Cambodia, Chinese bank networks, or Southeast Asian casinos that don’t require ID checks.

Why is Bitcoin the preferred currency for laundering?

Bitcoin is the most liquid cryptocurrency globally. It’s accepted by almost every OTC desk, crypto ATM, and exchange - even in places with weak regulations. Its network is large enough to absorb massive transfers without price slippage, making it ideal for moving hundreds of millions without drawing attention.

What role does Cambodia play in North Korea’s crypto laundering?

Cambodia, especially the city of Sihanoukville, hosts at least 14 North Korea-controlled crypto cafes that convert Bitcoin to cash with no ID required. The Huione Group, linked to North Korean officials, issues non-freezable stablecoins and acts as a financial bridge between crypto theft and physical cash. U.S. authorities have officially designated Huione as a major money laundering concern.

How do North Korean IT workers help launder crypto?

Thousands of North Korean IT workers are embedded in tech firms across China, Russia, and Southeast Asia. Using fake identities, they gain access to exchange systems and create backdoors that allow instant transfers from crypto wallets to bank accounts - bypassing 72-hour fraud detection windows. Many work as freelancers, getting paid in crypto and then cashing out through local, low-KYC exchanges.

Why did Tornado Cash stop working for North Korea?

Tornado Cash was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury in August 2022 after processing over $1.2 billion in stolen crypto, much of it linked to North Korea. Once sanctioned, any transaction involving Tornado Cash was flagged and frozen. North Korea shifted to faster, decentralized methods like cross-chain bridges and high-frequency small transactions to avoid detection.

Can blockchain analysis stop North Korea’s crypto laundering?

Blockchain analysis has improved by 40% since 2022, but North Korea’s adaptation speed has increased by 65%. They now use 400-500 small daily transactions, DeFi protocols, and custom cross-chain tools that evade traditional tracking. While analysts can spot patterns, they can’t always freeze funds fast enough - especially when cash-out happens in places with no regulatory oversight.

What’s the biggest vulnerability in North Korea’s cash-out system?

The biggest vulnerability is the final fiat conversion point. Only 3-5% of global exchanges allow large withdrawals without KYC. That’s why North Korea is building its own infrastructure - crypto cafes in Cambodia, fake financial firms in China - to bypass regulated systems entirely. Shutting down these physical hubs would cripple their ability to turn crypto into weapons.

Is North Korea’s crypto laundering getting easier or harder?

It’s getting harder to move money through regulated exchanges, but easier to convert it into cash through unregulated channels. Their success rate in turning stolen crypto into usable fiat has risen from 65% in 2020 to 92% in 2025. The challenge isn’t stealing - it’s cashing out. And they’ve mastered that.

11 Comments

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    Dexter Guarujá

    November 20, 2025 AT 19:21
    This is why we need to nuke the entire crypto industry. It's a lawless wild west that lets rogue states fund nukes with just a few clicks. We're letting terrorists turn digital bits into missile fuel, and nobody's doing anything real. Sanctions? Please. They're just suggestions to these guys. Time to shut down every decentralized exchange and force KYC on every wallet. No more excuses.
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    Jennifer Corley

    November 22, 2025 AT 12:21
    The real issue isn't North Korea-it's that the U.S. government has spent $200 billion on intelligence and still can't track $1.5 billion in crypto. We're not fighting hackers. We're fighting our own bureaucratic inertia. And don't even get me started on how many of these 'unregulated' exchanges are owned by U.S. investors in offshore shells.
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    Natalie Reichstein

    November 23, 2025 AT 08:38
    You think this is bad? Wait until the next time a rogue state figures out how to mint its own stablecoin backed by stolen Bitcoin. Then they'll have a currency no one can freeze, no one can trace, and no one can stop. And when that happens, the dollar won't be the reserve currency anymore-it'll be the punchline. We're already living in the future, and we're not ready.
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    Kaitlyn Boone

    November 24, 2025 AT 22:07
    so like... the whole thing is just people using crypto like cash but with no id? that's wild. i mean, if you can walk into a cafe in cambodia and get 2 mil in cash for btc... why even have banks anymore? it's not even crime anymore. it's just... business.
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    Kris Young

    November 26, 2025 AT 06:16
    I agree with the analysis. The four-step process is clear: steal, move, convert, cash. But we're missing the point: the real vulnerability is the human element. IT workers with fake IDs are the weak link. If we targeted their identities, their families, their digital footprints-instead of just freezing wallets-we could break this system faster.
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    LaTanya Orr

    November 27, 2025 AT 21:19
    It's not about the technology. It's about the human choice to look away. We built a system that rewards anonymity, then acted shocked when bad actors used it. We wanted decentralization, so we got chaos. We wanted innovation, so we got exploitation. The blockchain didn't betray us. We betrayed our own values by refusing to set boundaries.
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    Ashley Finlert

    November 28, 2025 AT 11:22
    The elegance of this operation is chilling. It is not merely criminal-it is systemic. North Korea has turned the very architecture of global finance-its gaps, its greed, its negligence-into a symphony of subversion. The crypto cafes of Sihanoukville are not hideouts; they are cathedrals of capital, where digital ghosts are baptized into physical power. And we, the architects of this world, stand outside, applauding the architecture while the altar burns.
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    Chris Popovec

    November 29, 2025 AT 13:27
    Let me tell you what they're not telling you: Tornado Cash wasn't shut down because it was dangerous. It was shut down because it was too effective. The real mixer is a private, encrypted protocol built by ex-Chainalysis devs who got tired of working for the NSA. That's why they're moving $500M without a trace. The government's own people built the backdoor. And now they're pretending they didn't.
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    Marilyn Manriquez

    November 30, 2025 AT 22:02
    We must remember that behind every transaction, there is a person. A child in Pyongyang who will never see the ocean. A mother in Sihanoukville who sells coffee to fund weapons. This is not abstract. This is human suffering disguised as geopolitics. We cannot solve this with technology alone. We must act with moral courage.
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    taliyah trice

    December 2, 2025 AT 17:50
    so they just take crypto and get cash? that's it? no magic? no hacking? just... go to cambodia and trade?
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    Charan Kumar

    December 4, 2025 AT 07:57
    in india we have similar problem with hawala networks for drug money but crypto is faster and global now. no need for human couriers anymore. just one code and money moves across continents. this is next level. governments need to think beyond borders now or they will keep losing

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